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ABSTRACT
Structural properties of a particular kind of LFSR-
based generators, the shrinking generators, have been
characterized and their cryptographic properties (pe-
riod, linear complexity, characteristic polynomial)
have been analyzed. Shrinking Generators (SG) can
be identi¯ed with a subset of linear Cellular Au-
tomata (mainly rule 90, rule 150 or a hybrid combi-
nation of both rules). The linearity of these cellular
models can be advantageously used in the cryptanal-
ysis of those keystream generators.
Keywords: Cellular automata, shrinking genera-
tor, LFSR, pseudorandom sequence, Cryptography,
Cryptanalysis
1. INTRODUCTION
Cellular Automata (CA) are discrete dynamic sys-
tems characterized by a simple structure but a com-
plex behavior [1, 2]. This con¯guration makes them
very attractive to be used in the generation of pseudo-
random sequences with multiple applications: simu-
lations, circuit testing, spread-spectrum communica-
tions or cryptography (stream ciphers). In this sense,
CA are studied in order to obtain a characterization
of the rules (mapping to the next state) producing se-
quences with maximal length, balancedness and good
distribution of 1's and 0's. These sequences can be
obtained from a given subset of speci¯c rules or com-
bination of such rules (for example, combinations of
rules 90 and 150). For more details, the interested
reader is referred to [3].
From a cryptographic point of view, it is fundamen-
tal to analyze some additional characteristics of these
generators, such as linear complexity which deter-
mines the unpredictability of the produced sequences
or correlation-immunity which assesses the strength
of the generator against possible cryptanalytic at-
tacks. The results of this study point toward the
equivalence between the sequences generated by CA
and those obtained from Linear Feedback Shift Reg-
isters (LFSRs) [4].
In this paper, the CA hybrid con¯gurations con-
structed from combinations of rules 90 and 150 are
considered. In fact, a linear model that describes the
behavior of a kind of pseudorandom sequence gen-
erator, the so-called shrinking generator (SG), has
been derived. In this way, the sequences generated
by SG can be studied in terms of CA. Thus, all the
theoretical background on CA found in the literature
can be applied to the analysis and/or cryptanalysis
of shrinking generators.
The work is organized as follows: in section 2, the
basic structures (SG and CA) presented in this pa-
per are introduced. Next, in section 3, the conver-
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sion of a SG into a model based on a hybrid cellular
automaton is described as well as a simple example
illustrates the procedure. Possible applications of the
CA-based model to the cryptanalysis of the SG are
discussed in section 4. Finally, conclusions in section
5 end the paper.
Fig. 1 - The shrinking generator scheme
2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE
BASIC STRUCTURES
In the following subsections, we introduce the general
characteristics of the two basic structures considered
in the paper: Shrinking Generators and Cellular Au-
tomata.
2.1 The Shrinking Generator
It is a very simple generator with good cryptographic
properties [5]. This generator is composed by two LF-
SRs: a control register, called R1, that decimates the
sequence produced by the other register, called R2.
The scheme is depicted in ¯gure 1.
The sequence produced by the LFSR R1, that is faig,
controls the bits of the sequence produced by R2, that
is fbig, which are included in the output sequence
fcjg (the shrunken sequence) , according to the fol-
lowing rule notated P :
1. If ai = 1 =) cj = bi
2. If ai = 0 =) bi is discarded.
We can see the behavior of this structure with an
easy example.
Example 1: Consider the following LFSRs:
1. R1 with length L1 = 3, feedback polynomial
1 + D + D3 in the indeterminate D and ini-
tial state (1; 0; 0). The sequence obtained from
such a LFSR is f0; 0; 1; 1; 1; 0; 1g whose period
equals 7.
2. R2 with length L2 = 4, feedback polynomial 1+
D3+D4 in the indeterminate D and initial state
(1; 0; 0; 0). The sequence obtained from such
a LFSR is f0; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0; 1; 1; 0; 1; 0; 1; 1; 1; 1g
whose period equals 15.
The output sequence fcjg will be determined by:
² faig ! 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 :::::
² fbig ! 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 :::::
² fcjg ! 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 :::::
The underlined bits 0 or 1 in fbig are discarded.
According to [5], the period of the shrunken sequence
is T = (2L2 ¡1)2(L1¡1) and its linear complexity, no-
tated LC, satis¯es the following inequality
L2 2(L1¡2) < LC · L2 2(L1¡1):
In addition, its number of 1's is constant and equals
No: 10s = 2(L2¡1)2(L1¡1):
Thus, the shrunken sequence is a balanced sequence.
Since simplicity is one of its most remarkable charac-
teristics, this scheme is suitable for practical imple-
mentation of e±cient stream cipher cryptosystems.
2.2 Cellular Automata
An one-dimensional cellular automaton can be de-
scribed as a n-cell register, whose cells (binary cells)
are updated at the same time depending on a k -
variable function [3] also called rule. If k = 2r + 1
input variables are considered, then there is a total
of 2k di®erent neighborhood con¯gurations. There-
fore, for a cellular automaton with binary content
cells there can be up to 22
k
di®erent mappings to the
next state, these are the di®erent rules ©. In fact, the
next state xt+1i of the cell x
t
i depends on the current
state of k neighbor cells
xt+1i = ©(x
t
i¡r; : : : ; x
t
i+r)
If these functions are composed exclusively by XOR
and/or XNOR operations, then the cellular automa-
ton is said to be an additive CA. Then, the next CA
state (xt+11 ; : : : ; x
t+1
n ) can be computed from the cur-
rent state (xt1; : : : ; x
t
n) as follows:
(xt+11 ; :::; x
t+1





where A is an nxn matrix with binary coe±cients
and C is the complementary vector.
In a CA, either all cells evolve under the same rule
(uniform or regular case) or they follow di®erent
rules, this being the hybrid case. At the ends of the
array, two di®erent boundary conditions are possi-
ble: null automaton when cells with permanent null
content are supposed adjacent to the extreme cells or
periodic automaton when extreme cells are supposed
adjacent.
In this paper, all automata considered will be null
hybrid CA with rules 90 y 150. For k = 3, these
rules are described as follows :
² rule 90 ! xt+1i = xti¡1 + xti+1
111 110 101 100 011 010 001 000
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
01011010 (binary) = 90 (decimal), that is the
reason why this rule is called "rule 90".
² rule 150 ! xt+1i = xti¡1 + xti + xti+1
111 110 101 100 011 010 001 000
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
10010110 (binary) = 150 (decimal), analogous
meaning for "rule 150".
The main idea of this work is to write a given SG in
terms of a hybrid cellular automaton, where at least
one of its output sequences equals the SG output se-
quence.
3. A SHRINKING GENERATOR LINEAR
MODEL IN TERMS OF CELLULAR
AUTOMATA
In this section, an algorithm to determine the one-
dimensional linear hybrid CA corresponding to a par-
ticular shrinking generator is presented. Such an al-
gorithm is based on the following facts:
Fact 1: The characteristic polynomial of the
shrunken sequence [5] is of the form
P (D)N
where P (D) is a L2-degree primitive polyno-
mial and N satis¯es the inequality 2(L1¡2) <
N · 2(L1¡1).
Fact 2: P (D) depends exclusively on the charac-
teristic polynomial (reciprocal of the feedback
polynomial) of the register R2.
Fact 3: Rule 90 at the end of the array in a null au-
tomaton is equivalent to two consecutive rules
150 with identical sequences. Reciprocally, rule
150 at the end of the array in a null automaton
is equivalent to two consecutive rules 90 with
identical sequences.
According to the previous facts, the following algo-
rithm is introduced:
Input: Two LFSR's R1 and R2 with their corre-
sponding lengths, L1 and L2, and characteristic poly-
nomials, P1(D) and P2(D), respectively.
Step 1: From L1 and P2(D), compute the polyno-
mial P (D). In fact, P (D) is the characteristic
polynomial of the cyclotomic coset E [6], where
E = 20 + 21 + : : : + 2L1¡1:
Thus,
P (D) = (D + ®E)(D + ®2E) : : : (D + ®2
L1−1E)
® being a primitive root in GF (2L2).
Step 2: From P (D), apply the Cattell and Muzio
probabilistic synthesis algorithm [7] to deter-
mine the two linear hybrid CA whose character-
istic polynomials are P (D). Such CA are writ-
ten as binary strings with the following codi¯-
cation: 0 = rule 90 and 1 = rule 150.
Step 3: For each one of the previous binary strings
representing the CA, we proceed:
1. Complement its least signi¯cant bit. The
resulting binary string is notated S.
2. Compute the mirror image of S, notated
S¤, and concatenate both strings
S ¤ S¤:
3. Repeat 1) and 2) L1 times.
Output: Two binary strings codifying the CA cor-
responding to the given SG.
Due to the particular form of the shrunken sequence
characteristic polynomial, it can be noticed that the
computation of the CA is proportional to L1 in-
stead of 2L1 . Consequently, the algorithm can be
applied to SG in a range of cryptographic interest
(e.g. L1; L2 ¼ 64). In order to clarify the previous
steps a simple numerical example is presented.
Example 2: Consider the following LFSRs: R1 with
length L1 = 2, characteristic polynomial P1(D) =
1 + D + D2 and R2 with length L2 = 5 and charac-
teristic polynomial P2(D) = 1 +D +D3 +D4 +D5.
Step 1: P (D) is the characteristic polynomial of the
cyclotomic coset 3. Thus,
P (D) = 1 + D2 + D5:
Step 2: From P (D) and applying the Cattell and
Muzio probabilistic synthesis algorithm, two
linear hybrid CA whose characteristic polyno-
mials are both P (D) can be determined. Such
CA are written as:
0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0
Step 3: The two binary strings of length L = 10
representing the required CA are:
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
with the corresponding codi¯cation above men-
tioned. The procedure has been repeated twice
as L1 = 2.
From L = 10 known bits of the shrunken sequence
fcjg, the whole sequence, whose period T = 62, can
be easily reconstructed. In fact, let fcjg be of the
form
fcjg = f0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 :::g;
then the initial state of the cellular automaton can
be computed from right to left, according to the cor-
responding rules 90 and 150, such as follows:
90 150 150 150 90 90 150 150 150 90
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0




Once the CA initial state is known, then the cellular
automaton will produce its corresponding output se-
quences and the shrunken sequence (here ¯rst on the
right) can be univocally determined. As the CA con-
sidered are null, the computation of the SG output
sequence can be carried out from left to right too,
just putting the 10 bits on the most left column. In
order to obtain the same SG output sequence, a sim-
ilar procedure can be applied to the second cellular
automaton determined in step 3.
4. APPLICATIONS OF THE CA-BASED
MODEL TO THE CRYPTANALYSIS OF
THE SHRINKING GENERATOR
Since a linear model describing the behavior of the
SG has been derived, the cryptanalysis of such a gen-
erator can be considered from di®erent points of view:
² Crytanalysis based on the SG linear complex-
ity: attacking the SG through its linear com-
plexity requires the knowledge of LC bits of the
shrunken sequence, LC being its linear com-
plexity, or equivalently, the length of the cellu-
lar automaton. Remark that this is just half the
sequence required by the Berlekamp-Massey al-
gorithm [8] to reconstruct the original sequence.
² Crytanalysis based on the Linear Consistency
Test (LCT): The linear consistency test [9] is a
general divide-and-conquer cryptanalitic attack
that can be applied to the SG on the basis of the
linear model provided by the CA. This attack
would require the exhaustive search through all
possible initial states of the LFSR R2, then the
complexity of the LCT would be proportional
to 2L2 steps.
² A new attack that exploits the weaknesses of
the linear model can be also considered. In fact,
according to the particular form of the CA and
due to its periodical structure (see section 3),
the shrunken sequence will be generated on av-
erage L1 times by the CA in a speci¯c state
cycle. Studying the distance among the shifted
sequences and concatenating them, the origi-
nal sequence can be reconstructed. Neverthe-
less,the shifts among the di®erent shrunken se-
quences depend on the particular structure of
the automaton considered.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the relationship between LFSR-based
structures and cellular automata have been stressed.
More precisely, a particular family of LFSR-based
keystream generators, the so-called Shrinking Gener-
ators, has been analyzed and identi¯ed with a subset
of linear cellular automata. In fact, a linear model
describing the behavior of the SG has been derived.
The algorithm to convert the SG into a CA-based
linear model is very simple and can be applied to
shrinking generators in a range of practical interest.
The key idea of this algorithm is that the number of
steps to be carried out is proportional to L1 instead
of 2L1 .
Once the linear equivalent model has been developed,
the linearity of this cellular model can be advanta-
geously used in the analysis and/or cryptanalysis of
the SG. Besides the traditional cryptanalitic attacks
(e.g. the linear complexity attack that here requires
half the sequence needed by the Berlekamp-Massey
algorithm and the LCT attack), an outline of a new
attack that exploits the weaknesses inherent to these
CA has been introduced too.
The proposed linear model is believed to be a very
useful tool to analyze the strength of the sequence
produced by a SG as a keystream generator in stream
ciphers procedures.
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